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REVOCATION OF A "LICENSE ACTED UPON"
Mayor and City Council oj Baltimore v. Brack'

Several years ago the City of Baltimore, defendant-appellant, withiout consideration, obtained oral consent to lay
a water main, sewer, and drain across the land in question
from the then owners, Mr. and Mrs. Lacey. Pursuant to
this oral consent, the City constructed a water main, sewer,
and drain across the land in question, entirely below the
surface except for several fire plugs and cover plates over
valves. At the time these utilities were constructed, or
subsequently, negotiations were conducted between the City
and Mr. and Mrs. Lacey for the purpose of securing a legal
easement to the City, but for some reason the negotiations
were not successful. In 1936 the land in question was purchased by Brack, plaintiff-appellee, with full knowledge of
the presence and use of these utilities. In 1937 plaintiffappellee filed his bill of complaint seeking a permanent injunction, compelling a removal of the utilities or the payment of compensation for their use. The defense of the City
was based upon the existence of the oral consent from Mr.
and Mrs. Lacey under the theory that: (1) A license become's
irrevocable after it has been acted upon by the licensee;
or (2) where a license has been acted upon, the licensee is
entitled to compensation as a condition precedent to revocation. The trial court entered a decree ordering removal,
and the City appealed. Held: Affirmed, and cause remanded, with leave to the City to apply for a stay until
final condemnation proceedings can be consummated.
The Court properly held that the oral consent given by
Mr. and Mrs. Lacey constituted a mere license and not a
legal easement, both because of the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds, and also because the parties clearly did
not intend to create a permanent interest in the land. Their
subsequent negotiations for the purpose of creating a legal
easement indicated that the parties were fully aware of the
fact that a mere license had been created by this oral consent. It is well settled that since a license does not create
a property interest in the land, no formalities are required
for its creation ;2 it may be implied from the relation of the
parties, from the conduct of the landowners, or may be ex2

3 At.

2 Pursell

(2nd) 471 (Md. 1939).

v. Stover, 110 Penn. 43, 20 AtI. 403 (1885) ; Bay View Land Co.
v. Ferguson, 53 Wash. 323, 101 Pac. 1093 (1909); Lockhart v. Geir, 54
Wise. 133, 11 N. W. 245 (1882) ; Noftsger v. Barkdall, 148 Ind. 531, 47 N. E.
960 (1897) ; Fisher v. Johnson, 106 Iowa 181, 76 N. W. 658 (1898).

1939]

BALTIMORE v. BRACK

pressly granted by parol. The corollary of this rule is that
a license may be revoked as simply as it was created ;3 by
express notice, by a sale or lease of the licensor's premises,
by the death or insanity of either party, and by any number
of similar acts inconsistent with the existence of the license.
Licenses are usually classified into six well defined
groups: (1) a license coupled with an interest or grant;4
(2) a bare unexecuted license; (3) a license to extinguish
an easement ;5 (4) a license with a contract against revocation;' (5) a license with an executory promise to execute
a legal easement; 7 and (6) a bare license acted upon. The
oral consent involved in this case clearly falls within the
sixth class, a bare license acted upon. The construction of
the water main, sewer, and drain upon the licensors' land
by the City clearly constitutes an "acting upon".
Where a bare license has been acted upon by the expenditure of money by the licensee in the construction of an
artificial structure or condition on the licensor's land which
will be rendered practically valueless to the licensee by the
revocation of the license, there are three totally different
views as to its revocability: (1) absolute revocability, (2)
absolute irrevocability, and (3) conditional revocability.
The rule of absolute revocabilityis based upon the strict
application of the Statute of Frauds." The purpose of this
Statute is to prevent the creation of property interests in
land by -ambiguous oral agreements. Therefore, ±Q hold an
oral license irrevocable becanse. it has been acted upon
would be a violatiou of the spirit of the Statute, and would
create insecurity to titles in land. Under this view a license after being acted upon retains its original character-:
istics as a contract right only, and as not creating any inter-,
est in the land other than relieving the licensee from liability as a trespasser.
The rule of absolute irrevocability is based upon the
belief that a fraud would be committedupon he licensee if,
after the expenditure of money and labor on his part. the
licensor should be permitted to revoke his license, and thus
15 Ill. Law Quarterly 26; 26 Yale Law Journal 395.
'Ely v. Cavanaugh, 82 Conn. 681, 74 Atl. 1122 (1910).
Winter v. Brakwell, 8 East 308 (1807).
'Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838 (1845) ; Hurst v. Pictures Theaters
Ltd., (1915) 1 K. B. 1.
'Cook v. Pridgen, 45 Georgia 331 (1872) ; Cumberland Valley R. Co. v.
McLanahan, 59 Penn. 23 (1868).
8Pifer v. Brown, 43 W. Va. 412, 27 S. E. 399, 49 L. R. A. 497 (1897);
Jones v. Stover, 131 Iowa 119, 108 N. W. 112, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 154
(1906); Mumford v. Whitney, 15 Wend. 381, 30 Amer. Dec. 60 (1836);
Lawrence v. Springer, 49 N. J. Eq. 289, 24 Ati. 933, 31 Am. St. Rep. 702
(1892); Foot v. N. H. and Northampton Co., 23 Conn, 214 (1854).
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render this expenditure of little value tcthe licenseeY Some
of the cases supporting this rule -are based upon the theory
that the expenditure of money and labor by the licensee constitutes a consideration for the license, so as to make the
license enforceable in equity as an executory contract to
execute a legal easement. The expenditure of money and
labor upon the land of the licensor constitutes a taking of
possession and making of permanent improvements, so as
to take an oral license out of the Statute of Frauds, and
make it enforceable in equity by specific performance. This
theory is sound if its application is limited to those cases
where the parties intended to, create a legal easement, but
through lack of the requisite formalities a mere license resulted. But in the great majority of cases of licenses there
is no evidence of any intention of the parties to, create a permanent legal interest in the land itself in the nature of an
easement. In most cases it is the gratuitous and friendly
act of a neighbor without any thought of the possibility
that he is creating a permanent burden upon his land. To
construe such a license into all executory contract to execute
an easement merely because the licensee has expended
money and labor pursuant to it, is to disregard the true
intentions of the parties and to penalize -an act of neighborly friendship.
By far the majority of cases supporting this rule of irrevocability do so on the theory of estoppel. They reason
that the action of the licensor, in :standing by and watching
the expenditure of money and labor without warning the
licensee as to the revocable character of his license, constitutes an implied representation that he will not revoke the
license. By virtue of such a representation the licensor is
said to be estopped to exercise his power of revocation so
long as the structure or condition, created by the money and
labor, is of benefit to the licensee. The objection to this
theory lies in the fact that an actual misrepresentation or
misleading conduct cannot be found. Both parties are
equally aware of the nature of the licensee's rights. The
licensor is not in such a position that he has superior knowledge of the legal rights of the parties, so as to owe the licensee a duty to speak. The licensee is equally aware of
the facts, and has, acted with full knowledge of his rights.
I Stoner v. Zucker, 148 Calif. 516, 83 Pac. 808, 113 Am. St. Rep. 301, 7
Ann. Cas. 704 (1906) ; Rearick v. Kern, 14 S. and R. (Penn.) 267, 16 Am.
Dec. 497 (1826) ; Appeal of Clelland, 133 Penn. St. 189, 19 Atl. 352, 7 L. R. A.
752 (1890) ; Curtis v. La Grande Water Co., 20 Oregon 34, 23 Pac. 808, 10
L. R. A. 484 (1890) ; Miller and Lux v. Kern County Land Co., 154 Calif.
785, 99 Pac. 179 (1908).
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No basis exists for construing the licensor's silence as an
implied representation that he will not revoke. In jurisdictions raising such an estoppel, the licensor's power of
revocation is only restricted during the life of the structure
or condition created by the expenditure of money and labor.
The rule of conditional revocability has been adopted in
several states because it preserves the Statute of Frauds
from infringement, but still protects the licensee from loss
of his expenditures." Under this rulethe licensor's power
to revoke is unimpaired, but as a conditiop precedent to
exercise of the power he must ulace the license in status
quo. As a result of this requirement the licensor must
fully compensate the licensee to the extent to which his
expenditure of money and Iabor will be rendered valueless
b- the revocation of the license . It should be noted that
this condition is in no manner dependent upon or limited by
the benefit which the ficensor has received from the expenditure. The case of Gilbert v. Schwerle" is an excellent
illustration of the application of this rule. In that case
oral consent to remove sand and gravel was given without
consideration. The licensee proceeded to. install the necessary machinery at considerable expense. Subsequently the
license was revoked, and in an action for damages by the
licensee, the court allowed compensation for the cost of installation and removal of the machinery.
This rule of conditional revocability seems to have been
fully adopted in the earlier Maryland cases. In Addison
v. Hack" the court approved the doctrine of conditional
revocation where the power of revocation exists, but found
that the license involved in that case was not a bare license
acted upon. Again in Lake Roland Electric R. Co. v.
3
Baltimore1
the court by way of dictum approved the rule
of conditional revocation, but found that the expenditure
of money and labor was not incurred in good faith in reliance upon the license. Finally in Northern Central R. Co. v.
Canton Company 4 the court expressly stated: "These
tracks having been laid by the parol license of the Canton
Company, that company cannot now revoke the license and
require the removal of the tracks without making full com10Woodbury v. Parshley, 7 N. H. 237, 26 Amer. Dec. 739 (1834) ; Gilbert
v. Schwerle, 49 S. D. 370, 207 N. W. 163 (1926) ; Savage v. City of Salem,
23 Oregon 381, 31 Pac. 832, 24 L. R. A. 787, 37 Am. St. Rep. 688 (1893) ;
Lane v. Miller, 27 Ind. 534 (1867) ; Androscoggin Bridge v. Bragg, 11 N. H.
102 (1840).
Supra, n. 10.
122 Gill 221, 41 Am. Dec. 421 (1844).
1277
Md. 352, 26 Atl. 510, 20 L. R. A. 126 (1893).
21 104 Md. 682, 65 Atl. 337 (1906).
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pensation." It must be noted that in all of these cases the
rule of conditional revocation was stated as requiring the
payment of "full compensation" for the loss resulting to
the licensee. In none of these cases was there any intimation that the recovery should be limited to the benefit received by the licensor from the expenditure.
However, when the later case of Brehm v. Richards1"
was decided, the Court of Appeals expressly limited the
compensation of the licensee to the benefit received by the
licensor from the expenditure. In that case the licensee
had constructed a paved road across the licensor 's land in a
location such that part of it was of benefit to the licensor
and part of sole benefit to the licensee. In the body of the
opinion the rule of conditional revocation, as stated by the
earlier Maryland cases, seems to be approved and adopted,
yet in the decree the right of compensation is expressly
limited to "those portions of the road which he (licensee)
will cease to use upon the issuance of the injunction, and
which are beneficial to Brehm in his use of the bridge and
way." This decision is a clear modification of the rule of
conditional revocability as stated in the earlier cases, and
in result a repudiation of that rule and the adoption of the
rule of absolute revocability coupled with a right to recover
from the licensor any benefit which he has received from
the expenditure. This is merely the recognition of the fact
that the exercise of the power of revocation makes any
benefit received by the licensor an unjust enrichment and
the basis of recovery in quasi-contract. If the right of
compensation is to be limited to the benefit received, then it
must be limited to recovery against the licensor himself and
not against a subsequent assignee with notice. As a quasicontract based upon unjust enrichment, only the person
receiving the benefit will be liable.
With this interpretation of Brehm v. Richards16 the
present case is in accord. Here the plaintiff-appellee
against whom compensation was claimed was not the original licensor. Therefore any right to compensation for the
benefit received must be restricted to recovery against the
original licensors, Mr. and Mrs. Lacey. From this case we
may conclude that Maryland has joined in the majority
view supporting the doctrine of absolute revocability, but
will permit recovery in quasi-contract against the original
licensor for any benefit which has been received from the
expenditure.
'5

16

152 Md. 127, 136 At. 618, 56 A. L. R. 1103 (1927).
Supra, n. 15.

